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Abstract
To consider the role of uncertain production cost resulting from complying with
rules of origin (ROO), we formulate a Cournot oligopoly model of a free trade area
(FTA). If exporters do not comply with ROO, they must pay an external tari,
and if they comply, they enjoy zero tari but suer an uncertain production cost.
Because compliers must source a certain ratio of the inputs from within the area,
they face input-price uctuations in that area; this yields an uncertain production
cost for compliers. This uncertain cost provides a benet to compliers owing to
its variance. Therefore, for an intermediate external tari, strategic substitution
emerges in exporters' choice. We show that the coexistence of compliers and non-
compliers is seen among symmetric exporters. We also discuss the endogenous rate
of ROO-compliers in the coexisting equilibrium of compliers and non-compliers.
We show that if the variance of the uncertain production cost is small, the rate
of ROO-compliers in the coexisting equilibrium increases with the number of total
exporters inside the FTA.
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1 Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, the number of free trade areas (FTAs) has dramatically increased,
with about 190 FTAs being present as of August 2012.1 In these FTAs, the rate of
external tari imposed by each member country usually diers. If there is no regulation,
imports from outside the FTA go through the member country with the lowest tari
rate: tari circumvention. To prevent tari circumvention by outsiders and distinguish
between intra-regional trade and outside trade, an FTA essentially needs rules of origin
(ROO). For example, to gain duty-free access within an FTA, exporters must source
a certain ratio of the inputs from within the area. Otherwise, exporters must pay an
external tari when they export to the other member countries' market.2 Therefore, if
the price of an input produced in the area is higher than outside, the cost of a complier
increases.3
As expected, some empirical studies indicate that the rate of compliance with ROO
is not 100% in many FTAs (Anson et al., 2005; James, 2006; Hayakawa et al., 2009).
A simple reason for coexistence of complying and non-complying rms is production
heterogeneity among rms. That is, if exporters' cost of using inputs originating in an
area is high, they do not choose compliance. In contrast, if their cost of using inputs
originating in the area is low, they comply. When complying with ROO yields a higher
production cost, the coexistence of compliers and non-compliers is often explained by
production heterogeneity among exporters (Demidova and Krishna, 2008).
However, when we view ROO from a dierent standpoint, we nd that the produc-
1See the web site of WTO (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx).
2There are at least three methods to determine the origin of a product: (1) value-added (or physical
content) based denition, (2) changes in tari heading, and (3) technical denition. For details, see
Falvey and Reed (1998) and WTO (2002).
3Many studies on ROO consider the positive eect of ROO on production cost in the input market.
As examples, see Krishna and Krueger (1995), Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1996), Krueger (1999), Rosellon
(2000), Falvey and Reed (2002), Ju and Krishna (2005), Duttagupta and Panagariya (2007), Takauchi
and Mizuno (2008), Takauchi (2010a, b; 2011), and Chang and Xioa (2011). In contrast to these
studies, there is a study that addresses a dierent issue: Ishikawa et al. (2007) omits the input market
and focuses on the price-discrimination behavior of exporters.
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tion cost yielded by ROO is not always certain. That is, for exporters, compliance with
ROO may yield an uncertain production cost. Because compliers must source a certain
ratio of regional inputs, they lose a chance to freely procure inputs in the world market.4
Then, compliers face input-price uctuations and input-quality dispersions within the
area, thereby suering from an uncertain production cost. Hence, in contrast to the
discussion on production heterogeneity, we propose another reason for the coexistence
of compliers and non-compliers. Actually, we focus on production cost uncertainty and
strategic interaction among symmetric exporters.
When the eciency of the rms is the same, the cost for using an input originating in
the area is also the same. In contrast, the benet from using this input may be dierent
among rms. For example, if the benet of compliance is divided between all compliers,
the benet earned by each complier decreases with the number of compliers. Hence, if
the number of compliers is larger than a certain level, the cost of compliance dominates
its benet. This result explains the coexistence of compliers and non-compliers. In
this paper, the benet of compliance is derived from the variance in the uncertain
production cost. When the prot function is convex for each observed marginal cost,
the expected prot is larger than the prot with mean marginal cost. The dierence
between the expected prot and the prot with mean marginal cost increases with the
variance in marginal cost.5
Following these discussions, we build a model that describes the role of production
cost uncertainty in relation to compliance with ROO. We consider a three-country,
two-exporter FTA Cournot oligopolistic model, with one consuming country and two
exporting countries housing two exporters and with an exporter in each exporting coun-
try. The exporters have two options, one is compliance and the other is noncompliance
with ROO. If exporters choose compliance, they enjoy zero tari but suer an uncer-
4In fact, the rms located in an FTA must raise the ratio of local sourcing in order to comply with
ROO. JETRO (2004) also emphasizes that ROO considerably aects the procurement strategy of rms
located in ASEAN countries.
5This nature of the prot function is the same as in Creane and Miyagiwa (2009).
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tain production cost. In contrast, if exporters choose noncompliance, they must pay
the external tari of the consuming country. The sequence of events is as follows. First,
each exporter decides whether to comply with ROO or not. Second, the marginal pro-
duction cost of compliers is chosen from a probability distribution function (pdf) with
positive mean and variance. Last, each exporter decides its quantity of production.
We show that under production cost uncertainty, the coexistence of compliers and
non-compliers appears in equilibrium if the rate of external tari is intermediate. Ex-
porters gain a benet from the variance (degree of production uncertainty) but suer a
loss from the uncertain marginal cost if they switch own strategy from noncompliance
to compliance. The gain and loss depend on the rival's choice: when the rival chooses
compliance, the loss from the uncertain marginal cost dominates the gain from the
variance. When the rival chooses noncompliance, the gain from the variance dominates
the loss from the uncertain marginal cost. The strategic substitution occurs if and only
if the rate of external tari is intermediate.
We further investigate the following two considerations: one is the eect of regime
switching on welfare in the consuming country and the other is the eect of the number
of total exporters in the ratio of ROO-compliers in the coexisting equilibrium of com-
pliers and non-compliers when many exporters exist. The rst consideration reveals
that welfare in the consuming country tends to decrease with the external tari. The
best regime for the consuming country is the one where no one complies with ROO,
the second-best is the one where compliers and non-compliers coexist, and the worst is
the one where all exporters comply. In the second consideration, we show that if the
variance of production uncertainty is small, the ratio of ROO-compliers increases as
the number of exporters increases.
As some empirical studies point out, the FTA utilization rate (the rate of ROO-
compliers) diers among industries and FTAs: some industries and FTAs have a higher
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utilization rate while some have a lower rate.6 Thus, we need to theoretically explain
what factors aect the FTA utilization rate. The second consideration implies that the
rate of ROO-compliers changes due to the competitive environment. We provide a new
insight in the context of trade and industrial policies within FTAs.
Our analysis is related to some existing studies of ROO that focus on the ex-
porter's choice (Ju and Krishna, 2005; Demidova and Krishna, 2008; Takauchi, 2010b).
Although these studies employ dierent models and consider that compliers and non-
compliers coexist, they do not examine the role of production cost uncertainty resulting
from compliance with ROO and tend to omit the ratio of exporters that comply with
ROO in the coexisting equilibrium.
This paper is also related to the oligopoly models that focus on the uncertainty
in demand and production.7 In a third-country market model, Creane and Miyagiwa
(2008) considers whether or not an exporting rm should disclose its information to
the government.8 Although the information structure of their model is similar to ours,
they focus on the rm's information strategy.
This paper is organized into ve sections. In the next section, a basic model (a
simple duopoly model of an FTA) is developed to examine exporters' strategic choice
between compliance and noncompliance with ROO. Section 3 examines the equilibrium
outcomes in the basic model. Welfare implications and the many-exporter case are
examined in section 4. Section 5 oers a conclusion.
6In particular, Hayakawa et al. (2009) empirically analyzes why the FTA utilization rate in ASEAN
is lower than that in other FTAs.
7In our knowledge, the pioneering study for such works is Gal-or (1985).
8Creane and Miyagiwa (2009) consider the problem of technology choice when there is uncertainty.
In their model, they assess whether or not a monopoly incumbent rm develops a new technology under
the threat of entry.
4
2 Basic model
We consider an oligopolistic FTA model with ROO. There is an FTA comprising three
countries|two exporting countries and one consuming country. The consuming coun-
try is a net importer of the product and the exporting countries are net exporters
without consumers. In each exporting country, there is an exporter and it exports
the product to the market of the consuming country. For simplicity and to focus on
the intra-regional market, we omit the exporters located outside the FTA. However,
we do assume that perfectly competitive input suppliers exist both inside and outside
the FTA. To gain duty-free access into the FTA, exporters must comply with ROO.
Otherwise, they must pay external tari t, which is imposed by the consuming country.
We assume that t is a non-negative constant.9
When exporters comply with ROO, they must source a certain ratio of the inputs
from within the FTA and they suer an uncertain production cost. The underlying
reason can be explained in two ways: input price and input quality. When exporters
do not comply with ROO, they can freely procure inputs from many countries outside
the FTA. Since the higher and lower prices of inputs cancel out, uctuations in the
average input price become suciently small. In contrast, by committing itself to use
the inputs originating from a certain country within the FTA, the complying exporters
directly face input-price uctuations in that country. In this case, the uctuations in
input price are larger and the variance is larger too.
The other is that by committing itself to source the inputs from within the area,
exporters must give up their chance to change sources exibly. This loss in exibility
may result in \unexpected lower quality of inputs" and \over adjustment in the pro-
duction process." As a result, complying exporters suer an uncertain production cost
when they comply with ROO.
We call the uncertain production cost \compliance cost c." We assume that all
9For simplicity, we assume that the transport cost is suciently small.
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exporters are risk neutral and face the same situation when they comply with ROO.10
The marginal (or unit) production cost of exporter i, ci, is dened as ci = c if exporter
i complies with ROO and as ci = t if it does not. While the rate of external tari t
is a non-negative constant, compliance cost c is a random variable with positive mean
 = Ec and variance 2  Var(c) = Ec2   2.11
In the consuming country, the inverse market demand function of the product is
p = a  bQ;
where p is the product price, Q = q1 + q2 is the total sales of the product, qi is the
output of exporter i, and a; b > 0. The prot of each exporter i is given by
i  (a  b(qi + qj)  ci)qi; (1)
where 1  i 6= j  2.
In this paper, we consider the game that has the following sequence of events:
e1. Each exporter independently and simultaneously chooses whether to comply with
ROO (labeled C) or not (labeled N).
e2. The marginal production cost of a complying exporter is chosen from a pdf with
positive mean  and variance 2.
e3. Each exporter competes a la Cournot in the market of the consuming country.
10Two exporters are major rms, and as such, the assumption of risk neutrality is natural.
11There exist many pdfs such that the above conditions are satised. For example, consider the
following pdf:
f(c) =

1= if 0 < c < 
0 otherwise:
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3 Equilibrium outcomes
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the model is solved by using backward in-
duction. We rst characterize the Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game.
3.1 Second stage: determinants of the distribution function
Let us consider outcomes in the second stage of the game. From (1), the exporter's
rst-order condition for prot maximization is
a  ci   2bqi   bqj = 0; (2)
where 1  i 6= j  2. From (2), we obtain the following.
q1(c1; c2) =
a  2c1 + c2
3b
; q2(c1; c2) =
a+ c1   2c2
3b
; (3)
i(c1; c2) = b[qi(c1; c2)]
2; Q(c1; c2) =
2a  c1   c2
3b
; (4)
p(c1; c2) =
a+ c1 + c2
3
; CS(c1; c2) =
b[Q(c1; c2)]
2
2
: (5)
The following four cases are thus obtained that depend on the rst-stage decisions of
exporters: (N;N), (C;C), (C;NC), and (NC;C). We consider (C;NC) and (NC;C)
to be the same regime. Let us call these three regimes as follows: (N;N), the no-
complier regime; (C;C), the all-complier regime; and (C;NC)/(NC;C), the mixed
regime.
From (3) and (4), we obtain the following:
NNi =
(a  t)2
9b
;
CCi =
(a  c)2
9b
; (6)
NC1 = 
CN
2 =
(a+ c  2t)2
9b
; NC2 = 
CN
1 =
(a  2c+ t)2
9b
:
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To ensure positive quantities, we set the following restriction on c and t.
Assumption 1. 0 < c < a=2 and t  (a+ c)=2.12
Because exporters are risk neutral and symmetric, from (6), the expected prot in
each regime is as follows:
ENNi =
(a  t)2
9b
; (7)
ECCi =
(a  )2
9b
+
2
9b
; (8)
ECN1 =
(a+ t  2)2
9b
+
42
9b
(= ENC2 ); (9)
ENC1 =
(a  2t+ )2
9b
+
2
9b
(= ECN2 ); (10)
where 1  i 6= j  2.
The most important dierence from the Cournot game under certainty is that each
exporter gains additional rent by complying with ROO (see the second term in (8){
(10)).13
3.2 First stage: exporter's choice between C and N
In the rst stage, each exporter chooses whether or not to comply with ROO. Before
the analysis, we set the following assumption on the variance in compliance cost.
Assumption 2. 2 < (a  ).
For any typical pdf with a positive mean (e.g., uniform, exponential, and gamma),
2  (a  ) does not hold. Therefore, for simplicity, we set Assumption 2.
Table 1 illustrates the payo matrix of the two exporters.
12After a pdf was realized, Assumption 1 is rewritten as follows: t;  < (a +minft; g)=2  . For
any 2 > 0, this ex-post restriction ensures a positive value in the expected prot of exporters.
13This depends on the risk neutrality of exporters. For example, see Gal-or (1985) and Creane and
Miyagiwa (2008, 2009) who employ a similar setting.
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N C
N ENN1 in (7), E
NN
2 in (7) E
NC
1 in (10), E
NC
2 in (9)
C ECN1 in (9), E
CN
2 in (10) E
CC
1 in (8), E
CC
2 in (8)
Table 1: Payo matrix of the two exporters
To derive the equilibrium outcomes, let us rst consider an exporter's best response.
Using (7){(10) and the above payo matrix, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. (i) Suppose that the rival (i.e., exporter j) chooses N . If tL(
2)  t
(tL(
2) < t), exporter i chooses N (C), where tL(
2)     2=(a   ). (ii) Suppose
that the rival chooses C. If   t ( < t), exporter i chooses N (C).
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Lemma 1 and the above payo matrix, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (i) If t 2 [0; tL(2)], the no-complier regime (N;N) appears. (ii) If
t 2 (tL(2); ), the mixed regime (C;N)/(N;C) can appear. (iii) If t 2 [; ), the
all-complier regime (C;C) appears. Here,   (a+minft; g)=2.
Proof. From Lemma 1 and the payo matrix, we obtain the following relations. (i)
When t 2 [0; tL(2)], ENN1  ECN1 , ENC1 > ECC1 , ENN2  ENC2 , and ECN2 >
ECC2 . (ii) When t 2 (tL(2); ), ENN1 < ECN1 , ENC1 > ECC1 , ENN2 < ENC2 , and
ECN2 > E
CC
2 . (iii) When t 2 [; ), ENN1 < ECN1 , ENC1  ECC1 , ENN2 < ENC2 ,
and ECN2  ECC2 .
These imply Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes in the t-2 plane.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In (7){(10), the expected-prots are constructed from two terms; note that in (7),
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the second term equals zero. To consider the eect of switching from noncompliance
(N) to compliance (C), by using (7){(10), we dene the following eects:
NMean =
8>><>>:
(a  t)2
9b
  (a+ t  2)
2
9b
if  > t
(a+ t  2)2
9b
  (a  t)
2
9b
otherwise;
CMean =
8>><>>:
(a  2t+ )2
9b
  (a  )
2
9b
if  > t
(a  )2
9b
  (a  2t+ )
2
9b
otherwise;
NV ar =
 429b   0
 = 429b ;
CV ar =
 29b   29b
 = 0:
When the rival exporter chooses N (C), NMean (
C
Mean) denotes the eect on the rst
term in prot due to a switch from noncompliance (N) to compliance (C). We call this
eect the \mean eect." Similarly, when the rival exporter chooses N (C), NV ar (
C
V ar)
denotes the eect on the second term in prot due to a switch from noncompliance (N)
to compliance (C). We call this eect the \variance eect."
If  < t, the mean eect is positive irrespective of whether the rival chooses N or
C. This is because the expected marginal cost is smaller when the exporter chooses C.
Moreover, the variance eect is also positive. The reason for this is that switching from
N to C makes one's cost, and thus prot, more uncertain. Thus, a larger variance (2)
provides a larger expected prot. Therefore, if  < t, switching from N to C increases
the exporter's prot irrespective of the rival's choice. Because C dominates N , the
equilibrium outcome is only (C;C).
Next, we consider the case of  > t. If the exporter switches its strategy from N to
C, the rst term in prot decreases. This is because this change increases the expected
marginal cost from t to . In this case, the mean eect denotes the switching cost
from N to C. As with the former case, the variance eect is also positive. Hence, the
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variance eect denotes the benet of switching from N to C.
Here, we illustrate the graph of mean and variance eects with t on the horizontal
axis. Because the variance eect is independent of t, the variance eect is constant for
t. Since  > t, an increase in t reduces the dierence in expected marginal cost. Hence,
the mean eect, that is, the cost of switching from N to C, decreases with t.
To explain why the variance eect is larger when the rival chooses N than when
the rival chooses C, we consider the following order: 42=9b > 2=9b > 0. That is,
the decreasing order of the second term in expected prot. This order depends on the
size of the coecient of c in (6). When one exporter chooses C and the other chooses
N , a change in c has a direct eect only on the prot of the exporter choosing C. In
contrast, this change in c indirectly aects the prot of the exporter choosing N . Thus,
the coecient of c in prot is larger in CN1 (= 
NC
2 ) than in 
NC
1 (= 
CN
2 ) in (6).
This means that the second term (variance) of the expected prot in (9) is larger than
that in (10). Next, we consider the case where both exporters choose C. In this case,
while changing c aects both exporters' prot, the eect is the same. Hence, the eect
of a change in c on exporters' prot is intermediate. In our model, the second term in
expected prot is the same for (8) and (10). Finally, when both exporters choose N ,
the prot function in (6) does not contain the random variable c. Hence, the second
term in expected prot is zero. Therefore, since we obtain 42=9b > 2=9b > 0, the
variance eect is larger when the rival chooses N : NV ar > 
C
V ar.
Next, we explain why we have CMean > 
N
Mean. Since  > t, arranging the rst
terms in (7){(10) in the order of decreasing size, we have
(a  2t+ )2
9b
>
(a  t)2
9b
>
(a  )2
9b
>
(a+ t  2)2
9b
:
The reason why the rst and last inequalities are satised is the increase in the rival's
mean marginal cost from t to . The second inequality is satised because the change in
the outcome from (C;C) to (N;N) decreases the mean marginal cost of both exporters.
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The mean eect NMean = (a   t)2=9b   (a + t   2)2=9b denotes an increase in prot
generated due to the rival's ineciency, when the rival switches its strategy from N to
C. As such, this indirectly aects the exporter's prot. In contrast, the mean eect
CMean = (a  2t+ )2=9b  (a  )2=9b denotes an increase in prot generated due to
the exporter's eciency, when the exporter switches from C to N . Hence, this directly
aects the exporter's prot. Because this direct eect dominates the indirect eect, we
have CMean > 
N
Mean.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Now, we can explain the intuition behind Proposition 1, since we know the reasons
underlying NV ar > 
C
V ar and 
C
Mean > 
N
Mean. In Figure 2, if t < tL(
2), the mean
eect (i.e., CMean and 
N
Mean) is always larger than the variance eect (i.e., 
C
V ar and
NV ar). Hence, the dominant strategy is N ; this result leads to the equilibrium outcome
(N;N). Next, if t > , the variance eect is always larger than the mean eect.
Hence, the equilibrium outcome is (C;C), since the dominant strategy is C. Finally,
for tL(
2) < t < , the mean eect is larger than the variance eect (CMean > 
C
V ar) if
the rival chooses C and the inverse holds (NMean < 
N
V ar) if it chooses N . That is, the
decisions on compliance are strategic substitutes. Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes
are (C;N) and (N;C).
4 Extension
This section oers two extensions of the basic model. The rst is on the welfare con-
sequences of a reduction in the external tari (or optimal tari consideration) and the
second is on the emerging of the mixed regime under many exporters.
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4.1 Eects of external tari reduction
First, we consider the relationship between consumer surplus and the rate of external
tari imposed by the consuming country.
Consumers' surplus in the consuming country From (5), the expected consumer
surplus in each regime is
ECSNN =
2(a  t)2
9b
; (11)
ECSCC =
2(a  )2
9b
+
22
9b
; (12)
ECSNC =
(2a  t  )2
18b
+
2
18b
= ECSCN : (13)
To see the eect of a regime switch on consumer surplus, we consider the relationship
between expected consumer surplus and the rate of external tari. Using (11){(13), we
establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For all 2 > 0, consumer surplus is U-shaped for the rate of external
tari, that is, it is minimized at t = .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between expected consumer surplus and the
external tari.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
This result is explained by the following consideration. An increase in the rate of
external tari increases the production cost of exporters and (undoubtedly) reduces
the industry output. In the no-complier and mixed regimes, there is at least one
exporter that pays the external tari. Since the increase in tari deteriorates production
eciency, industry outputs in these two regimes decrease as the external tari increases.
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In the no-complier regime, there are two exporters that pay the external tari. In the
mixed regime, the number of non-compliers is half as compared to in the no-complier
regime. Therefore, consumer surplus in the no-complier regime is located above the
mixed regime and its slope too is steeper. In contrast, in the all-complier regime,
there is no non-complier, and the expected consumer surplus is constant for the rate of
external tari.
However, in the all-complier regime, the eect of variance is the strongest. Let us
compare the variance eect in the all-complier and mixed regimes (the second terms
in (12) and (13), respectively). While the variance eect in the all-complier regime
is 22=9b, the variance eect in the mixed regime is only 2=18b: the reason for this
is that in the mixed regime, the number of compliers is half as compared to that in
the all-complier regime. Since consumer surplus in the mixed regime decreases as the
external tari increases but that in the all-complier regime is constant, the relationship
may reverse on the interval [tL(
2); ]. Therefore, from the consumers' viewpoint, the
mixed regimes may be the worst among all the regimes.
Social surplus in the consuming country The expected social surplus of the
consuming country EW comprises of two factors: expected consumer surplus ECS and
expected tari revenue ETR. For this reason, welfare, here, diers from consumer
surplus.
Using (3) and (11){(13), we obtain the following expected social surplus in each
regime:
EWNN  ECSNN + ETRNN = 2
9b
(a  t)(a+ 2t); (14)
EWNC  ECSNC + ETRNC = EWCN  ECSCN + ETRCN ;
=
1
18b
(2a  t  )2 + 1
3b
(a  2t+ )t+ 
2
18b
; (15)
EWCC  ECSCC : (16)
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In the all-complier regime, no exporter pays the external tari. Therefore, social surplus
is equivalent to consumer surplus.
Comparing (14){(16), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (i) For the consuming country, the best regime among all the regimes
is the no-complier regime, the second is the mixed regime, and the worst regime is the
all-complier regime. (ii) If  > a=4 and 2 < (1=4)(a   )(4   a), or   a=4, the
minimum optimal external tari rate such that the mixed regime does not appear is t;
if  > a=4 and 2 > (1=4)(a )(4 a), the optimal external tari rate is tNN = a=4.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates two possible shapes of the expected social surplus for the external
tari rate. The welfare-maximizing rate of the external tari is slightly lesser than
tL(
2) or tNN (the optimal rate of external tari in the no-complier regime).
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Proposition 3 shows that the welfare of the no-complier regime is the best among
all the regimes. The reason behind this result is as follows. In the no-complier regime,
there is no complier. Hence, the variance term does not emerge (see (14)). However, in
that regime, there are two exporters that pay external tari and the consuming country
gains the largest tari revenue among all regimes. This tari revenue considerably lifts
welfare upward, and as such, the welfare of the no-complier regime is the largest among
all the regimes. Furthermore, because the tari revenue tends to increase with the rate
of external tari, the welfare of this regime also tends to increase with the external
tari.
In the mixed regime, there are a non-complier and a complier. Thus, in that
regime, the consuming country gains tari revenue that is at least half of that in the
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no-complier regime; further, the variance term is not more than half of that in the all-
complier regime (see (15)). However, upward eects of tari revenue and the variance
term are not so large, and welfare in this regime is intermediate. In the all-complier
regime, there are no non-compliers and tari revenue does not emerge. Welfare thus
equals the expected consumer surplus (see (16)). Although the variance term of the
all-complier regime is the largest among all the regimes, it is still small (see Assumption
2). Therefore, welfare in this regime is the smallest among all the regimes.
4.2 Mixed regime under many exporters
In this subsection, we consider the ratio of ROO-compliers when n ( 2) exporters exist.
For simplicity, hereafter, there is one exporting country that houses n exporters.14
Let us consider thatm ( n) exporters comply with ROO, and thus, n m exporters
do not. The prot of exporter i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng is:
i =
0@a  b nX
j=1
qj   ci
1A qi:
The rst-order condition of prot maximization leads to
qi =
a  ci   b
Pn
j=1 qj
b
: (17)
Adding up over i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and solving for
Pn
j=1 qj yields
nX
j=1
qj =
na Pnj=1 cj
b(n+ 1)
: (18)
Since m exporters comply with ROO and n m exporters do not, we obtainPnj=1 cj =
14Of course, it is possible to consider that n exporting countries exist within an FTA and each country
has one exporter.
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mc+ (n m)t. From this equation, (17), and (18), we have
nX
j=1
qj =
na mc  (n m)t
b(1 + n)
; qi =
a  (1 + n)ci +mc+ (n m)t
b(1 + n)
:
Then, the prot of exporter i is
i =
[a  (1 + n)ci +mc+ (n m)t]2
b(1 + n)2
;
where ci = c if exporter i complies with ROO, and ci = t otherwise.
We derive the expected prot in the rst stage of the game:
ECi =
[a  (1 + n m)+ (n m)t]2
b(1 + n)2
+
(1 + n m)22
b(1 + n)2
; (19)
ENi =
[a+m  (1 +m)t]2
b(1 + n)2
+
m22
b(1 + n)2
; (20)
where superscript C (N) denotes the equilibrium outcome in which the exporter com-
plies (does not comply) with ROO. Since ECi = E
N
i must be satised in equilibrium,
solving this equation for m leads to the equilibrium number of exporters that comply
with ROO:
m =
1 + n
2
+
(a  t)(t  )
(t  )2 + 2 ;
where superscript \" denotes that the outcome is in equilibrium.
We consider the eect of an increase in the number of exporters on the ratio of
compliers (m=n). Dierentiating m=n with respect to n yields:
@m=n
@n
=
(  t)(2a  t  )  2
2n2[2 + (t  )2] :
We can summarize these results as follows.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that there are n ( 2) exporters. (i) The number of ROO-
compliers in the mixed regime equilibrium is m = (1+n)=2+(a t)(t )=[(t )2+2].
(ii) An increase in the number of exporters increases the rate of ROO-compliers, m=n,
if and only if 2 < ( t)(2a t ). Otherwise, it decreases the rate of ROO-compliers.
One might consider that result (ii) of Proposition 4 is slightly paradoxical: even
though variance is small, why does keener competition among exporters raise the ratio
of ROO-compliers? To explain this result, we use (19) and (20). Derivation yields
@Ci
@n
=  2[a  (1 +m)t+m][a  (n m)t  (1 + n m)]
b(1 + n)3
+
2(1 + n m)m2
b(1 + n)3| {z }
(>0)
;
@Ni
@n
=  2[a  (1 +m)t+m]
2
b(1 + n)3
  2m
22
b(1 + n)3
< 0:
For now, let us consider that the number of compliers, m, does not change. If
the number of exporters increases, a non-complier's prot decreases. This is because
an increase in the number of exporters implies an increase in the number of non-
compliers. Then, non-compliers have an incentive to comply (choose C). To maintain
the mixed regime, the prot of compliers should not increase. From (19) and (20),
the rst term of compliers' prot is ambiguous toward an increase in the number of
exporters. In contrast, the second term undoubtedly increases with the number of
exporters: because an increase in the number of exporters implies an increase in the
number of non-compliers, the rent resulting from variance expands.
In this case, compliers' prot possibly decreases if the number of compliers, m,
increases. Because the number of exporters receiving rent from the variance increases,
the per-capita rent of compliers becomes small. However, the eect of an increase in
the second term dominates any other eect when variance is large; if so, the prot of
compliers may increase with the number of exporters.
Therefore, by raising the number of compliers in order to maintain the mixed regime
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for an increase in the number of exporters, the variance must be small.
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the uncertain production cost resulting from compliance with
ROO and considers the role of this uncertain cost on exporters' choice in a simple
Cournot oligopolistic FTA model. We show that the uncertain production cost and
strategic substitution among exporters' choice are important for the coexistence of
compliers and non-compliers. If the rate of external tari is low enough, noncompli-
ance becomes the dominant strategy and the no-complier regime appears. In contrast,
if the external tari rate is high enough, the benet from cost uncertainty becomes
relatively large and the all-complier regime appears. For an intermediate external tar-
i, strategic substitution among exporters' choice emerges and the mixed regime (i.e.,
some exporters comply with ROO but other do not) appears.
We also show that the welfare of the consuming country tends to decrease with
the external tari rate; the best is the no-complier regime, the second-best is the
mixed regime, and the worst is the all-complier regime. This is because the degree of
uncertainty is not so large, and the tari revenues have a larger weight on welfare. We
extend the two-exporter benchmark to the case of many exporters and derive the ratio of
compliers in a mixed regime. We show that if the variance in the uncertain cost is small,
the ratio of compliers increases with the number of exporters. This result has much
signicance. In fact, the ratio of ROO-compliers usually diers among industries and
FTAs. Therefore, we need to consider the factors that yield this dierence and aect
the ratio of ROO-compliers. Since our result implies that a competitive environment
within an FTA changes the ratio of ROO-compliers, we can say that we oer a new
insight in the context of trade and industrial policies inside FTAs.
Finally, we discuss the avenues for future research. Our model developed herein
can be extended to the analysis of other conditional policies, for example, to the case
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of environmental regulations for virgin and recycled inputs. Such regulations are often
observed in the energy and paper industries. In the context of international trade and
environmental policy, Higashida and Jinji (2006) examines the eect of strategic uses
of recycling regulations in a two-way oligopoly model without production uncertainty.
Therefore, it may be fruitful to apply our model in an imperfect competitive market
with the above environmental standard. However, such an analysis surpasses the scopes
of this paper and we thus leave this argument to another work.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we prove Lemma 1 and Propositions 3 and 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. First, comparing ENN1 and E
CN
1 , we obtain
ENN1   ECN =
4[(a  )(  t)  2]
9b
=
4(a  )[tL(2)  t]
9b
= ENN2   ENC2 ; (A1)
where tL(
2)     2=(a   ). 0 < tL(2) <  as long as 0 < 2 < (a   ). From
(A1), we obtain the following relations:
ENN1
(
 ECN1 if tL(2)  t
< ECN1 if tL(
2) < t
; ENN2
(
 ENC2 if tL(2)  t
< ENC2 if tL(
2) < t
:
Further, from (A1), ENN1   ECN1 (= ENN2   ENC2 )  0 if t  .
Second, comparing ENC1 and E
CC
1 , we obtain
ENC1   ECC1 =
4(a  t)(  t)
9b
= ECN2   ECC2 : (A2)
Thus, from (A2), ENC1 > E
CC
1 and E
CN
2 > E
CC
2 if t < . In contrast, E
NC
1 
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ECC1 and E
CN
2  ECC2 if t  . These results imply Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma 1,  > tL(
2). ECSNN is U-shaped for t and
minimized at t = a. ECSNC is U-shaped for t and minimized at t = 2a . Since a > 
and 2a    > , ECSNN and ECSNC are decreasing functions for t on the interval
[0; ]. Comparing ECSNN and ECSNC at t = 0, we have ECSNN jt=0 ECSNC jt=0 =
(1=18b)[(4a  )  2]. Since 2 < (a  ) < (4a  ), ECSNN jt=0 > ECSCN jt=0.
Comparing ECSNN and ECSNC at t = tL(
2), we get ECSNN jt=tL   ECSNC jt=tL =
[2 + (a   )2]2=6b(a   )2 > 0. However, this relation reverses at t = . That
is, ECSNN jt=   ECSNC jt= =  2=18b < 0. Further, comparing ECSNC jt= and
ECSCC , we get ECSNC jt=  ECSCC =  2=6b < 0. Since ECSNC is decreasing but
ECSCC is constant for t, ECSNC and ECSCC have a single crossing point. Comparing
ECSNC and ECSCC , we obtain ECSNC = ECSCC if and only if t = t0  2a     p
32 + 4(a  )2 > 0. Simple algebra yields
tL(
2)  t0 = 1
a  

(a  )
q
32 + 4(a  )2   22(a  )2 + 2 :
From this, we get

(a )p32 + 4(a  )22 [2(a )2+2]2 =  [(a )2+2]2 < 0.
Furthermore,   t0 =p32 + 4(a  )2  2(a  ) and (a  )p32 + 4(a  )22 
[2(a  )]2 = 32 > 0. Thus, we obtain tL(2) < t0 < . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) We consider the ranking EWNN and EWNC . Simple algebra
yields
EWNN   EWNC = 1
18b

3t2 + 2(a  4)t+ (4a  )  2 :
Thus, EWNC  EWNN if 2  3t2 + 2(a   4)t + (4a   )  . We prove that
EWNC  EWNN does not hold for 2 < (a  ). (a  )   =  3t2   3a  2(a 
4)t. Hence, if   a=4,  > (a   ). Solving (a   )    = 0 for t, we obtain
t = (1=3)
h
 (a  4)p(a  16)(a  )i. Since  > a=4 > a=16, the discriminant
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(a   16)(a   ) has a negative value. From the coecient of t2, (a   )    has an
inverted-U shape for t and does not have a real root. Thus,  > (a  ). In the range
of 0  2  (a   ), there is no 2 that satises EWNC  EWNN . Therefore, we
obtain EWNC jt=tL < EWNN jt=tL .
(ii) At t = , we obtain EWNC

t=
 EWCC =  (1=6b)[2   2(a   )]. Since
2 < (a  ), EWNC jt=   EWCC > 0.
(iii) We must verify that EWNC > EWCC for all t in [tL(
2); ]. Simple algebra
yields
EWNC   EWCC = (4a  3)+ 2(a+ 4)t  11t
2
18b
  
2
6b
 :
Solving   0 for t, we get t   t  t+, where
t   1
11

a+ 4 
p
a2 + 52a  172   332

;
t+  1
11

a+ 4+
p
a2 + 52a  172   332

:
From the discriminant a2 + 52a   172   332,  = 0 has no real root if 2 >
(1=33)(a2 + 52a  172). However, we obtain
a2 + 52a  172
33
  (a  ) = a
2 + 19a+ 162
33
> 0:
Thus,  = 0 has two real roots: t  and t+. Here, we show that t  and t+ do not
belong to the interval [tL(
2); ]. Since (a + 4)2  
p
a2 + 52a  172   332
2
=
11[32 (4a 3)] and (=3)(4a 3) (a ) = a=3 > 0, (a ) < (=3)(4a 3).
Hence, t  < 0. From t+ > 0, we must verify whether or not   t+ < 0:
  t+ = 1
11
h
 (a  7) 
p
a2 + 52a  172   332
i
:
The second term inside the square brackets [] is always positive. By substituting the
upper limit of 2 = (a ) into the second term inside the square brackets, we obtain
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p
a2 + 19a+ 162 > 0. Since
p
a2 + 52a  172   332 is monotonically decreasing
with 2, this second term is positive for all 2 < (a ). If the rst term is nonnegative
( (a   7)  0), [ (a  7)]2  
p
a2 + 52a  172   332
2
= 33[2   2(a   )].
Since (a ) < 2(a ), 2  2(a ) does not hold. Thus, t+ > . Furthermore,
if  (a   7)  0, t+ >  holds from    t+. Therefore, EWNC > EWCC for all t in
[tL(
2); ].
(iv) EWNN has an inverted-U shape for t. From the welfare equation, the peak
of EWNN is given by tNN = a=4. tNN   tL(2) = [(a   )(a   4) + 42]=[4(a   )].
Thus, if   a=4, then tNN  tL(2). In the case where  > a=4, tNN < tL(2) if
2  (1=4)(a )(4 a). Since (a )  (1=4)(a )(4 a) = (1=4)[a(a )] > 0,
(a ) > (1=4)(a )(4 a). Thus, the optimal external tari rate is tNN if  > a=4
and 2 > (1=4)(a  )(4  a). Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium outcomes in the t-2 plane (two exporters).
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ects of switching from N to C.
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Figure 3: Eects of regime-switches on consumer surplus.
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ects of regime-switches on domestic welfare.
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